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This paper assesses corruption levels and trends among countries in the transition 
countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA), based on data from several sources 
that are both widely used and cover most or all countries in the region.  Data from firm 
surveys tend to show improvement in most types of administrative corruption, but little 
change in “state capture” in the region.  Broader, subjective corruption indicators tend to 
show somewhat greater improvement in ECA than in non-ECA countries on average.  A 
“primer on corruption indicators” discusses definitional and methodological differences 
among data sources that may account in large part for the apparently conflicting 
messages they often provide.  This discussion concludes that depending on one’s 
purpose, it may be more appropriate to use data from a single source rather than a 
composite index, because of the loss of conceptual precision in aggregation.  A second 
conclusion is that the gains in statistical “precision” from aggregating sources of 
corruption data likely are far more modest than often claimed, because of 
interdependence among data sources.  The range of detailed corruption measures 
available in firm surveys are exploited to show that broad, perceptions-based corruption 
assessments appear to measure primarily administrative corruption, despite their stated 
criteria placing great weight on “state capture.”  Finally, the paper emphasizes the need 
for scaling up data initiatives to fill significant gaps between our conceptual definitions of 
corruption and the operational definition embodied in the existing measures.  3
1. Introduction 
 
This paper assesses corruption levels and trends among countries in the Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region, based on data from several sources that are both 
widely used and cover most or all countries in the region.  To make sense of these data, 
the paper also examines the properties of the corruption indicators themselves.  The ECA 
region is the most appropriate one for this analysis as it has the richest set of available 
country-level data on corruption.  Because the various data sources are not always in 
agreement, we examine definitional and methodological issues in a “primer on corruption 
indicators” before reporting evidence on levels and trends.   
Section 2 discusses definitional and methodological differences among data 
sources that may account in large part for the apparently conflicting messages they often 
provide.  Section 3 assesses claims that the solution to disagreement among sources is to 
aggregate them, on the assumption that they collectively are more informative than is any 
single source.  Section 4 presents evidence from the various data sources on corruption 
trends in the ECA region.  The range of corruption measures available in firm surveys are 
exploited in section 5 to show that broad, perceptions-based corruption assessments 
appear to measure primarily administrative corruption.  Section 6 concludes with 
recommendations.  The main points of the paper are summarized below for convenience: 
•  Existing corruption indicators differ importantly in the aspects of corruption they 
purport to measure, in clarity and breadth of definition, and in the methods and 
transparency of their assessments.  For these reasons, no one indicator or data 
source is best for all purposes. 
•  Aggregating corruption indicators from numerous sources – with the goal of 
increasing precision in measurement - does not always produce a more 
appropriate measure than using a single indicator or data source.  One cost that 
should be considered is the loss of conceptual precision through aggregation.     4
•  Gains in statistical precision from aggregating sources of corruption data likely 
are far more modest than often claimed, because the assumption of independent 
error in measurement among data sources is violated. 
•  For various reasons, changes over time in corruption ratings should be interpreted 
with extreme caution.  For example, changes in perceptions indicators from one 
year to the next often are intended to correct ratings regarded in hindsight as 
incorrect.   
•  Enterprise surveys such as BEEPS measure only corrupt transactions between 
public officials and business firms, and in that sense provide a more limited 
picture than more broadly-defined corruption measures.  The advantage of firm 
surveys such as BEEPS is in providing narrow, specific indicators such as bribes 
paid in tax collection or in business licensing, and in providing objective 
measures on share of firm revenues or contract values paid as bribes to public 
officials.  The BEEPS also allows firm-level analyses, e.g. on which types of 
firms pay more in bribes. 
•  Changes over time in corruption levels as measured by firm surveys can produce 
valid inferences if the survey questions and sample design are identical in both 
periods, and if other factors are controlled for where necessary.  For example, 
perceptions that corruption is an obstacle to doing business are potentially 
affected by optimism, or by prevailing economic conditions. 
•  Data from BEEPS, as well as from the WEF executive opinion surveys, show 
improvement in the region in most but not all types of administrative corruption 
between 2002 and 2005, and little change in “state capture.” 
•  Most of the broad, perceptions indicators of corruption show somewhat greater 
improvement in ECA than in non-ECA countries on average between 2002 and 
2005. 
•  Sources – including firm surveys - disagree markedly on which ECA countries 
have improved and which have not.  This apparent disagreement is in part 
attributable to the fact that changes in expert assessments often reflect corrections 
rather than a belief that corruption has actually improved or worsened.  In general, 
the rankings provided by different sources show convergence between 2002 and 
2005, so in that sense are not really inconsistent. 
•  Detailed corruption questions in BEEPS and WEF can be used to shed light on 
what aspects of corruption are emphasized by the broad, perceptions-based 
indicators.  The latter appear to measure primarily administrative corruption, 
rather than “state capture,” and appear to measure corruption in public 
procurement particularly poorly. 
•  More research is needed to understand better the informational content and 
possible biases in existing corruption indicators.    5
•  There is a need to develop more “actionable” indicators, assessed for most 
developing countries, of public sector policies and institutions potentially 
important in combating corruption.  Monitoring progress on these indicators could 
provide greater incentive for reform. 
2. Properties of Corruption Indicators 
There are numerous definitions of corruption in the academic literature and 
among donor agencies.  Most of these definitions are quite broad, and often somewhat 
vague.  Transparency International’s definition, “the misuse of entrusted power for 
private gain,” is representative.
1  Often, the term “misuse” or “abuse” is further defined to 
apply only to illegal actions.  Accepting the brief conceptual definition offered by TI, 
“corruption” can be disaggregated along many dimensions: 
•  By level of political system (central government, provincial, municipal), 
roughly corresponding to the terms “petty” and “grand” corruption; 
 
•  By purpose of the improper actions: to influence the content of laws and 
rules (“state capture”) or to influence their implementation 
(“administrative corruption”); 
 
•  By the actors involved in the corrupt transaction: various combinations of 
firms, households, and public officials; 
 
•  By characteristics of a particular set of actors, for example bribes required 
for large v. small firms, or for rich v. poor households; 
 
•  By administrative agency or service: tax and customs, business licenses, 
inspections, utility connections, courts, or public education and health 
facilities. 
 
•  By incidence or magnitude of bribes, or by the uncertainty they create for 
businesses and households.   
 
Regardless of one’s preferred conceptual definition, the choice of measurement 
techniques from a limited set of feasible alternatives inevitably produces an implicit 
                                                 
1 http://www.transparency.org/faqs/faq-corruption.html.  Also see the definitional discussion in Sandholtz 
and Koetzle (2000), and sources cited therein.    6
definition that may differ substantially from one’s ideal.  Any pair of assessment 
methodologies will measure a different (if unknown) mix of these various dimensions of 
corruption.  For example, what weight should be given to central, state and local 
governments when assessing “corruption” for federal countries such as the United States 
or India?
2  These sorts of questions typically are not explicitly answered in the 
methodology of existing country-level indicators.  Table 1 provides examples of different 
methods for generating country-level corruption measures.   
The strength of nationally-representative surveys of firms or households is in 
measuring the incidence of corrupt behaviors encountered by users of government 
services.  This approach emphasizes administrative corruption.  However, firm surveys 
can measure some aspects of state capture, by including questions about improper 
influence over laws and regulations affecting business.  Surveying firms and households 
is less effective in assessing the prevalence of corrupt transactions that occur entirely 
within the state, for example when politicians bribe bureaucrats or when funds are 
illegally diverted.  Many types of conflicts of interest also are not easily captured by firm 
surveys, for example equity stakes of public officials, or employment promises to them 
by firms (World Bank, 2000).  
The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) is a 
nationally-representative survey of business firms assessing corruption and other 
problems faced by businesses in the ECA region.  The BEEPS is sponsored by the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank, and 
has covered almost every country in the region, in each of three survey waves: 1999, 
                                                 
2 The impact of corruption should be lessened if firms and households in corrupt cities or states (e.g. 
Louisiana or Bihar) can readily move to less corrupt areas (e.g. Minnesota or Kerala).   7
2002 and 2005.  Similar enterprise surveys have been conducted by the World Bank in 
many countries in other regions, but so far they have been done only on a country-by-
country basis, rather than region-wide every three years as with BEEPS. 
The World Economic Forum’s (WEF) “Executive Opinion Survey” is another 
cross-country survey of firm managers.  In the 2005 survey, a total of 10,993 responses 
were received, ranging from 22 for Mauritius to 473 for Russia.  Cross-country rankings 
on several corruption questions (see Appendix B5) from this survey are published for 117 
countries in WEF’s annual Global Competitiveness Report (Lopez-Claros, Porter and 
Schwab, 2005).  Ratings are computed as the simple average of all executives’ responses.  
Another organization, the IMD, uses a nearly identical methodology, but using somewhat 
different survey questions, in its World Competitiveness Yearbook (IMD, 2005).  The 
IMD executive survey is conducted in many fewer countries than the WEF survey, and it 
includes fewer questions on corruption.  The IMD also discloses less information than the 
WEF on the size and composition of its sample of executives in each country. 
The WEF and IMD executive opinion surveys differ from the BEEPS (and the 
World Bank’s other firm surveys) in several important respects.  First, the sample in each 
country is selected with a preference for executives with international experience, who 
tend to be from larger and exporting firms.  Second, the questions are designed to elicit 
“the expert opinions of business leaders” on corruption and other issues, and focus much 
less than BEEPS on firms’ experiences.  The WEF, for example, asks about diversion of 
public funds – an issue on which few firms would have direct knowledge.  Third, the 
WEF and IMD surveys are designed solely to produce country-level measures of the 
business climate.  The BEEPS (and other World Bank firm surveys) is designed for firm-  8
level analyses, and the datasets include numerous characteristics of the responding firms, 
while taking care to preserve firm anonymity to encourage candid responses.
3 
Household surveys addressing corruption issues are not quite so well developed 
as firm surveys.  Beginning in 2003, Transparency International annually has sponsored 
the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), conducted with assistance from Gallup 
International’s survey network.  The number of countries covered has expanded from 44 
in 2003, to 64 in 2004, and 69 in 2005.  The questions changed almost entirely from 2003 
to 2004, but much of the 2004 content remained in the 2005 survey.  The World Values 
Surveys (WVS), International Crime Victimization Surveys (ICVS), “Voice of the 
People” surveys by Gallup International, and several regional “Barometer” surveys have 
also included questions on households’ experiences with, or attitudes toward, corruption.  
Most of these household surveys suffer from greater comparability problems than does 
the BEEPS.  For example, the surveys administered by Gallup International (including 
the GCB) cover only urban households in many countries.  Unlike the BEEPS, results 
from the WVS and regional “Barometer” surveys are made public only with long lags, 
limiting their value in diagnosing problems and designing policy responses.   
Expert assessments of corruption have been most widely used for comparisons 
across countries and over time.  A large and growing number of organizations provide 
such assessments.  Their methods differ in several potentially important ways.   
First, they differ in the degree to which assessments are “centralized.”  The 
centralized type is exemplified by Nations in Transit (NIT) and by the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  Corruption ratings from these sources are informed by a 
                                                 
3 Information and data for the World Bank’s investment climate assessment surveys are available at 
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/ics/jsp/index.jsp.   9
network of correspondents with country-specific expertise, but the final ratings are 
determined centrally by a very small number of people. 
In the decentralized type, views are solicited from experts only for countries in 
which they have direct experience.  Two examples are the UNECA’s Africa Governance 
Indicators (Economic Commission for Africa, 2005) and the World Governance 
Assessments (Hyden, Court and Mease, 2004).  The Africa Governance Indicators (AGI), 
covering corruption and other governance issues, are based on surveys of elites in 28 
countries, conducted in 2002-2003.  The AGI “expert panels” varied in size from about 
70 to 120 across countries.  From 83 total questions in the survey, responses to 7 were 
used in constructing a “Corruption Control” index for each country.
4   
World Governance Assessments were conducted in late 2000 and early 2001 in 22 
developing countries from various regions, including Bulgaria, Kyrgyzstan and Russia 
from the ECA region.  In each country, 35 “well-informed persons” were asked 30 
questions, including 3 pertaining to corruption (in business licensing, in the judiciary, and 
favoritism in applying regulations).  Data in 6 of the 22 countries were deemed to be of 
unacceptably low quality, so the publicly available data set covers only 16 countries.
5  At 
this time it is unclear whether or not the World Governance Assessments and the Africa 
Governance Indicators will fulfill their original intentions to expand their country 
coverage, and to track changes over time. 
Managers of business firms may be viewed as merely a special category of “well-
informed persons.”  The distinction nevertheless is important.  Questions in the enterprise 
surveys place a greater emphasis on experience, and less on perceptions.  Moreover, 
                                                 
4 See http://www.uneca.org/agr/. 
5 See http://www.odi.org.uk/WGA_Governance/Index.html.   10
respondents in firm surveys can be asked more specific and objective questions, because 
they comprise a more homogeneous group.  A survey of elites that includes public 
officials, academics, journalists, etc. must frame questions in such a way that they can be 
answered meaningfully by all of them, which necessitates broader questions.  All of the 
83 questions in the UNECA survey, and all 30 in the WGA survey, are subjective, with a 
standard set of five qualitative response categories. 
The World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) is a 
hybrid of centralized and decentralized expert-based ratings.  The ratings originate with 
the country teams and regional offices, but then are reviewed for cross-regional 
comparability by central units.  Most ratings proposed by the regions are not changed in 
this review, however, and the final ratings are correlated at about .98 with those proposed 
by the regions.   
A second way in which expert assessments differ from each other is in the extent 
of documentation they provide regarding definitions and methods.  For example, NIT 
provides more details than ICRG on its assessment criteria and its methodology 
(including sources of information), and provides extensive country narratives containing 
qualitative assessments of corruption problems to accompany the quantitative ratings.  
The CPIA is transparent in some respects but opaque in others.  Its detailed assessment 
criteria are posted on a public web site, and there are reasonably detailed narratives 
justifying the ratings.  Neither the ratings nor the justifications are publicly released 
however.
6  Sources that are more transparent and accountability, as reflected by the 
availability of detailed assessment criteria and justifications for ratings of each country, 
                                                 
6 Ratings, but not justifications, for the IDA-eligible countries will be publicly released for the first time in 
summer 2006.    11
arguably will tend to be more accurate in their assessments.  At a minimum, one can 
debate meaningfully the appropriateness of the rating and the validity of the methods and 
information underlying them.  Where definitions are brief, vague, and broad, and ratings 
are not accompanied by justifications for each country, such debate is impossible.  
Corruption indicators also differ in attempting to assess either:  
a)  the relative incidence of corrupt transactions, or  
b)  the impact of corruption on business, or 
c)  the existence of government and other mechanisms believed to affect the 
prevalence of those transactions. 
 
The ICRG is an example of type (a), while type (b) is illustrated by the NIT corruption 
index.  Appendixes B2 and B4 provide the criteria used by ICRG and NIT.  The World 
Bank’s CPIA question 16 (see appendix B3) is a mix of types (a) and (c).  Most questions 
in the BEEPS and WEF are of type (a), but each source contains type (b) questions also.  
One BEEPS question asks how problematic is corruption “for the operation and growth 
of your business.”  Two other BEEPS questions ask about the “impact on your business” 
from other firms’ payments to Parliamentarians or government officials to influence laws 
and regulations.  The WEF similarly asks whether or not “other firms’ illegal payments to 
influence government policies, laws, or regulations impose costs or otherwise negatively 
affect your firm.” 
Sources of corruption indicators may have varying constituencies or audiences, 
with potential implications for what their ratings are measuring.  Some sources, such as 
Freedom House (which produces Nations in Transit) are advocacy NGOs.  Others, such 
as the ICRG, are marketed by for-profit companies to multi-national investors and other 
paying subscribers.  Most subscribers to the ICRG are more interested in conditions   12
facing foreign investors than in those facing local investors.  To the extent corruption-
related obstacles differ for those two sets of investors, the ICRG ratings can be expected 
to focus on those most pertinent to its paying subscribers.  Corruption ratings produced 
by development agencies (including the World Bank’s CPIA, and similar ratings 
produced by the African Development Bank and Asian Development Bank) are also 
potentially influenced by their constituents.  Because the CPIA ratings are important in 
determining IDA allocations for the World Bank’s lower-income countries, the Bank’s 
country teams could benefit from proposing higher-than-warranted ratings.  Country 
teams may also find their working relations with country counterparts impaired if their 
assessments are unfavorable.  However, statistical analysis finds no evidence that IDA 
countries are overrated relative to non-IDA countries.
7 
Corruption indicators differ in conceptual breadth; some are more multi-
dimensional than others.  The ICRG, NIT, and CPIA each provide a single measure of 
corruption, but one intended to reflect a mix of various aspects of corruption.
8  The 
BEEPS and WEF surveys contain multiple questions pertaining to narrower aspects of 
corruption.  For some purposes, broader measures may be preferred: a researcher testing 
the hypothesis that more women in parliament reduces corruption (Swamy et al., 2000), 
or that corruption slows economic growth (Mauro, 1995), may not be concerned about 
exactly how corruption is defined.  Theory may provide little guidance as to which 
aspects of corruption are most harmful to growth.  Similarly, a donor wanting to direct 
more aid to less-corrupt countries may have no particular view on which aspects of 
                                                 
7 Specifically, if the CPIA corruption ratings are regressed on other available corruption indicators and on 
an IDA dummy, the coefficient for the latter is negative, instead of positive as implied by the potential 
incentive bias.  
8 Question 16 in the CPIA actually contains three sub-ratings, but each of these in turn assesses multiple 
aspects of corruption (or mechanisms intended to deter it).    13
corruption most impair aid effectiveness.  For other purposes, however, narrower 
measures may be required.  For example, an effective and convincing test of the 
hypothesis that higher civil service pay reduces bribe-seeking may require measures of 
administrative (rather than grand) corruption.  A donor funding projects in a country may 
be interested in a measure of corruption in public procurement, while a donor providing 
budget support might prefer a measure of the likelihood of diversion of funds to 
unintended purposes.  The design of effective anti-corruption reforms requires narrow 
measures to identify specific problem areas and track progress over time.   
Broader corruption measures (such as the ICRG or NIT) not only are less 
conceptually precise (for good or ill), but - less obviously - their meanings also tend to be 
more uncertain.  For the ICRG, NIT or CPIA corruption indicators, the weights given to 
the various aspects of corruption listed in their assessment criteria are unknown.  By 
contrast, consider the case of constructing a multi-item index from several of the BEEPS 
(or WEF) corruption measures.  Aggregation of them implies a reduction in conceptual 
precision.  But in this case there is no increase in uncertainty over what is being 
measured, because the data user selects the indicators to include in the index and the 
weights assigned to each indicator.  However, with broader, multi-dimensional indicators 
such as ICRG, data users have no way of knowing exactly what the indicators are even 
attempting to measure.  Even for NIT with its detailed criteria, is each of the 10 criteria 
equally weighted in the overall assessment?  Some of the ten would seem to be more 
important than others (e.g., compare #7 to #6).  This uncertainty problem is exacerbated 
for other corruption indicators for which no such criteria are made public at all, as is the   14
case for corruption measures produced by two competitors of the ICRG: the Economics 
Intelligence Unit (EIU) and World Markets Research Centre (WMRC).
9 
A final distinction among corruption indicators is that some are more suitable than 
others for measuring changes over time.  Broad, multi-dimensional indicators are 
potentially problematic in this respect, because there is no way to ensure that the implicit 
weights given to the various dimensions do not vary over time.  Some indicators have no 
fixed and explicit criteria provided for each ratings level, so there is no way of ensuring 
that a rating of (say) 4 means the same thing from one year to the next.  The ICRG is an 
illustrative example.  Its ratings guide (PRS Group, 2003) states that ratings are intended 
to be comparable both across countries and over time.  But it provides no indication of 
what conditions are described by a rating of 2, 3, 4, etc.
10  Nations in Transit provides 
only a generally-worded set of criteria for each of its 1-7 ratings levels, written to apply 
not only to corruption but to NIT’s six other indicators.
11  The WEF questions on 
frequency of irregular payments have 7 response categories, ranging from “is common” 
(1) to “never occurs.”  How respondents interpret “common” may be relative and change 
over time.  In principle, the CPIA criteria are fixed and explicit, so can be used to assess 
progress over time.  In practice, however, the criteria are revised somewhat every few 
years, and they are sufficiently subjective that the standards for a given ratings value may 
not be fixed.   
                                                 
9 Unlike the case with ICRG, the EIU and WMRC corruption indicators are not included in their standard 
products, but are part of a set of “customized” indicators available for a separate fee. 
10 Moreover, there is a dramatic and unexplained “break” in the data between October and November 2001.  
In a typical month few ratings change; for example from July 2001 to August 2001 the only change was a 
decline for Mexico.  From October 2001 to November 2001, however, there were 10 increases and 43 
decreases.   
11 For example, the lowest rating of 7 implies an “absence of practices that adhere to basic human rights 
standards, democratic norms, and the rule of law” on the NIT corruption index and on its other six indexes: 
National Democratic Governance, Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media, Local Democratic 
Governance, and Judicial Framework and Independence.     15
Changes in methods, as well as in content, can reduce over-time comparability of 
indicators.  Admirably, WEF has tried to increase the response rate of its Executive 
Opinion Survey, to enhance accuracy by making the sample more representative.
12  
However, progress on this front can affect apparent trends.  Suppose executives with the 
strongest opinions are the most likely to respond, and that strong opinions tend to be 
unfavorable.  An increase in the response rate from one year to the next would then 
reduce the negative bias, but the year-on-year change would be biased toward showing 
improvement. 
3. Composite Corruption Indexes 
There are at least three possible justifications for constructing a single corruption 
index from multiple, distinct sources of corruption indicators.  The first motive 
emphasizes substantive content: individual indicators, or even several indicators from one 
source such as the BEEPS, may be defined too narrowly for certain purposes.  For 
example, no matter how many corruption indicators one aggregates from the BEEPS, the 
resulting index still reflects only corrupt interactions between firms and public officials.   
The second motive is to reduce measurement error.  Given the obvious difficulties 
in measuring corruption, any one source may be highly inaccurate.  However, if errors in 
measurement are largely independent across sources, the errors will tend to cancel out 
when data are aggregated from multiple sources.   
The third motive is to cover a larger number of countries.  No one source covers 
all countries.  Some sources do not overlap at all in country coverage, for example the 
UNECA’s African Governance Indicators and Nations in Transit. 
                                                 
12 The mean number of responses per country increased from 84 in 2004 to 94 in 2005.   16
The latter two motives were responsible for the creation of Transparency 
International’s widely-cited “Corruption Perceptions Index,” and subsequently WBI’s 
“Control of Corruption” index (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005).  Although the 
statistical methods vary somewhat, both of these indexes standardize corruption 
indicators from numerous sources to place them on a comparable scale, and compute an 
average (unweighted for TI, weighted for WBI) of them to obtain one value for each 
country.  Missing values on any indicator for a given country are ignored, so are in effect 
imputed as the average of all indicator values for which data are available for the country.  
By this procedure, an index value can be computed for any country with data available 
from even one of the many sources used.
13 
The original purpose for the TI index was to raise awareness of corruption, and to 
provide researchers with better data for analyzing the causes and consequences of 
corruption.  It has achieved these goals in spectacular fashion, and is regularly cited in 
news reports on corruption around the world.  The WBI index, appearing several years 
after the TI index, was intended by its authors to improve and expand on TI in several 
ways.  First, the WBI index provides a value for any country with data available from 
even one source, while the official TI index requires three sources.  Second, the WBI 
index incorporates data from more sources, including ICRG and others which TI rejects 
on various grounds (Lambsdorff, 2005a).  Third, using many of the same data sources, 
WBI constructs five other broad “governance” indexes.
14  Fourth, WBI weights available 
sources differently, in contrast to the equal weighting in TI of available sources for each 
                                                 
13 The index on TI’s web site lists only countries for which three or more data sources are available.  The 
index on Johan Lambsdorff’s web site lists index values for all countries with available data on one or more 
sources.  Lambsdorff is the creator of the TI index.  See  http://www.icgg.org/corruption.index.html 
14 These five include Rule of Law, Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Violence, Regulatory 
Quality, and Government Effectiveness.     17
country.
15  Finally, WBI attempts to improve on the treatment of statistical uncertainty in 
TI.  While TI lists number of sources, and the range and standard deviation among 
sources, WBI computes a “standard error” as an indicator of uncertainty accompanying 
each point estimate.  These standard errors are lower for countries (1) covered by more 
data sources, and (2) for countries covered by data sources which are more highly 
correlated with other sources in the index. 
For the consciousness-raising and research purposes that inspired these aggregate 
indexes, the intuition underlying them is plausible.  Measurement error is likely to be 
reduced somewhat by combining data from multiple sources.  The expansive definition of 
corruption implied by aggregation was a virtue for TI’s and (later) the World Bank’s 
consciousness-raising agendas, and for cross-country empirical research demonstrating 
adverse economic consequences of corruption. 
The limitations of these composite indexes are often neglected by data users, 
however.  Some of these problems are common to the broad corruption measures from 
individual sources such as ICRG, NIT or CPIA.  Other limitations are introduced by the 
process of aggregation.  
Transparency in construction 
If any component of a composite index is constructed in an opaque manner, the 
composite index in turn will be somewhat opaque, regardless of the transparency of the 
aggregation process itself.  If the documentation in the ICRG, for example, provides little 
guidance as to how various aspects of corruption are weighted, or what information 
                                                 
15 Even for TI, some sources will have a greater overall weight in the full set of index values, merely by 
having data available for more countries.  For example, WEF covers many more countries than does IMD.    18
sources are used, one cannot fully explain what the WBI “Control of Corruption” index is 
measuring or on what basis.   
Although both TI and WBI provide thorough explanations of their aggregation 
methodology, replication of the indexes by independent analysts would be costly, 
particularly as the number of sources used has expanded over the years.  Some of the 
sources are available only to paying subscribers or members, and some are not publicly 
available at all.
16 
Conceptual imprecision, uncertainty and inconsistency 
The TI and WBI indexes by construction are even more conceptually imprecise 
than some of their broadly-defined components (e.g. ICRG, NIT and CPIA).  They are 
also more conceptually uncertain: the uncertainty in how criteria are weighted is 
compounded by aggregation.  In contrast to any single broadly-defined indicator, the TI 
and WBI composite indexes suffer from having varying definitions.  Composite indexes 
have no explicit definition, but instead are defined implicitly by what goes into them.  
The sources used in constructing these composite indexes change over time, so the 
implicit definition of corruption reflected in the index values changes over time.  
Moreover, the sources used in constructing the indexes vary from country to country in a 
given year.  Estonia’s 6.4 corruption rating and Latvia’s 4.2 corruption rating in the 2005 
TI index are based on two different sets of indicators, hence on differing implicit 
definitions of corruption. 
Among the 27 ECA countries, there are 13 distinct combinations of sources used 
in computing the 2005 TI index, so the 27 index values reflect 13 different implicit 
                                                 
16 The CPIA indicator used in the WBI index will be available for the first time in the summer of 2006, but 
only for the IDA-eligible (i.e. lower income) countries.    19
definitions of corruption.  Index values for the three Baltic countries are based on three 
distinct combinations of indicators.  Values for Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia - which 
like the Baltic nations are often compared to each other – are also based on three different 
combinations of indicators.  The same is true for the three Caucasus countries, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia.  This comparability problem is even more severe for the 2004 
WBI index on Control of Corruption.  It uses 23 different combinations of sources for the 
27 ECA countries.  No one combination of sources is used to construct index values for 
even three countries.  There are only four pairs of countries whose values are based on a 
common set of sources: Russia and Poland are based on the same 14 sources, Estonia and 
Romania on the same 13 sources, Bulgaria and Lithuania on the same 12, and Croatia and 
Latvia on the same 11.
17   
In principle, more strictly comparable comparisons could be performed simply by 
computing a composite index that deletes any source not common to the two countries in 
question.  Alternatively, one could simply compare two countries source by source, not 
bothering to construct a composite index at all.  Either of these options requires access to 
the underlying data, however, which neither TI nor WBI provide.   
The definitional inconsistency across countries entailed by using a different mix 
of sources is the price of maximizing the number of countries covered by the index.  
Corruption ratings are generated for more countries by TI and WBI when more sources 
(even those with spotty coverage) are aggregated, but for any pair of countries the index 
values are very likely to reflect differing implicit definitions of corruption. 
Tracking Changes Over Time 
 
                                                 
17 This information was provided by Jim Anderson, who closely examined data sources in the TI and WBI 
indexes.     20
The standardization procedure used to place different indicators on a common 
scale precludes the ability to track changes meaningfully over time.  The WBI index, for 
example, is constructed to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 for each year 
the index is provided (1996, 1998, 2002 and 2004).  Not only index values, but even 
rankings are not comparable across years as the composition of the sample changes.  The 
addition of Luxembourg to the TI sample in 1997, and Iceland in 1998, reduced the 
rankings of most other nations.  This limitation of the composite indexes often is not 
appreciated, as reflected not only in numerous media references to the TI index but also 
in many internal World Bank memos, and even in papers submitted for publication to 
academic journals.   
The over-time comparability problem raised by changes in country coverage can 
be corrected, for the most part, by comparing rankings over time for a constant set of 
countries.  For example, among the 102 countries included in the TI index in every year 




th.  Neglecting to 
adjust for a common sample, its ranking falls from 27
th to 31
st. 
The above method corrects only for changes in coverage of other countries, and 
not for year-to-year changes in the underlying data sources and indicators available for 
the country in question.  Even setting aside expanded country coverage, changes from 
one year to the next in a country’s ratings on TI or WBI could be driven purely by adding 
a new source to the index, or dropping an outdated one.  No TI index value for any ECA 
country was based on the same set of sources in both 2004 and 2005.
18  The WBI indexes 
for 2002 and 2004 are based on the same set of sources for only 4 of the 27 countries in 
                                                 
18 The BEEPS data from 2002 were included in the TI index for 2004, but no BEEPS data were used in the 
2005 index.  For most ECA countries, this was not the only change in TI sources used in 2004 and 2005.     21
the ECA region: Hungary, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Tajikistan.  As with a pair-
wise comparison of countries at a point in time, a comparison for a single country at two 
points in time would be more convincing if it were based on a common set of sources.  
Again, one could do this in principle, by going to the component data sources, but many 
of them would be costly or impossible to access for most data users.  A second-best 
solution would be for TI and WBI to add to their web sites a tool that allows purer 
comparisons over two time periods (or across two countries) by computing customized 
indexes based only on sources common to both years (or countries). 
Interdependence of Sources  
Intuitively, if several sources assess a country more favorably in year 2 than in 
year 1, we can infer more confidently that an actual improvement occurred than if 
evidence of progress were based on a single data source.  This intuition is valid only to 
the extent that different sources represent independent judgments.  In classifying which 
countries have improved or worsened to a “statistically significant” degree over time, 
both WBI and TI assume that assessments from each source are fully independent.
19  
However, many of their sources clearly are not independent.  The CPIA process takes 
into account numerous expert assessments and firm surveys, and ratings often are 
adjusted to be more consistent with rankings from those sources.  The expert assessments 
(of the “centralized” type) in turn often consult each other, and sometimes adjust ratings 
for outliers.  The EIU provides little information on definition or methodology for its 
corruption rating, as noted by Lambsdorff (2005b).  He shows that the EIU ratings are 
                                                 
19 Setting aside the technical problems, Lambsdorff (2005a, 2005b) at least is careful to interpret changes in 
the TI index as shifts in perceptions of governance.  Kaufmann (2005) on the other hand interprets 
statistically significant increases in the WBI indexes as improvements in governance which demonstrate 
that “countries can substantially improve” their quality of governance “even in the short term.”   22
strongly related to lagged, but not contemporaneous WEF corruption ratings.  The 
simplest explanation for this result - although not one mentioned by Lambsdorff - is that 
the EIU assessments may systematically incorporate the most recently available WEF 
ratings.  Interdependence does not even require, however, that sources directly check 
each others’ ratings; it could also result merely from sources relying on the same 
publications for their information about conditions in countries. 
In contrast to most expert assessments, surveys of firms and households generate 
data likely to be largely independent from other judgments.  Most respondents in business 
surveys such as the BEEPS are unlikely to know the TI ratings for the country in which 
they operate, and even for the few that do know, it is unlikely to influence their response 
to a question on the share of their firms’ revenues paid in bribes.  The WEF “Executive 
Opinion Survey” differs from BEEPS in several respects, however, that could make it 
less independent.  First, the sample of executives is deliberately chosen to elicit the views 
of “business leaders” with extensive international experience.  These executives are more 
likely than those in the BEEPS to be aware of the TI and other cross-country ratings.  
Second, the WEF survey questions deliberately are phrased in such a way that 
respondents will “compare their own environment to a world standard, rather than 
thinking in national terms.”  Some respondents may consult other cross-country rankings 
in order to provide a seemingly better-informed response.  Third, the WEF and IMD both 
implement similar executive surveys, with samples selected by “partner institutes.”  The 
WEF and IMD share many of the same partner institutes, so many of the same executives 
are likely to be included in both sets of surveys.
20 
                                                 
20 The WEF and IMD have at least one partner institute in common in 12 of the 51 countries that are 
included in both sets of surveys.  These two organizations jointly published the “World Competitiveness   23
It is impossible to determine quantitatively the degree of interdependence among 
sources used in TI and WBI.  Many of the cross-country or over-time differences they 
classify as “statistically significant” undoubtedly would not be, if the appropriate 
corrections for interdependence could be made.   
This unknown but substantial degree of interdependence among many of the 
sources also obviates any claims regarding the “precision” of estimates.  Other things 
equal, one can have more confidence in a rating based on 9 sources than on a rating for 
another country based on only 3 sources.  It is also important however to identify the 
sources and to consider the likely degree of interdependence among them.  Three sources 
comprised of a firm survey, a household survey and an expert assessment may provide a 
richer set of information than 9 sources, if all 9 are expert assessments.  Iceland’s 2002 TI 
index is computed from six sources, which at first glance appears impressively diverse.  
However, none of them are truly independent: three of them are from WEF surveys for 
2000, 2001 and 2002, and the other three are from IMD surveys for the same years.
21  
Although the partner institutes in Iceland are different for WEF and IMD, the likelihood 
of overlapping samples of top executives with international experience in a country so 
tiny must be very high.  Iceland in TI is an extreme example of interdependence, but the 
problem in more moderate form is endemic to both TI and WBI.  Claims of “being 
precise about imprecision” (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton, 2000) ) depend on 
independence of assessments, hence cannot be supported. 
The Choice of Weights in Aggregation 
                                                                                                                                                 
Report” from 1989 through 1995, but went their separate ways in 1996, with the WEF publishing the 
“Global Competitiveness Report” and the IMD publishing the “World Competitiveness Yearbook.”  Both 
organizations list their partner institutes on their web sites. 
21 The TI index uses the most recent three years of data for WEF and IMD.  The WBI index uses only the 
most recent year.    24
 
Simplicity, objectivity, transparency and replicability all argue for weighting each 
variable (or each source, for sources that provide multiple indicators are provided by one 
source) equally in constructing a composite index.    The TI index weights each of its 
sources equally, with a caveat: the three most recent WEF and IMD surveys are each 
included as a separate source.  They each therefore receive triple the weight given to 
another source, such as the EIU or the WMRC.   
The goal of accuracy could justify differential weighting, if there is good reason 
to believe that some sources are more informative than others.  For this reason, the WBI 
index weights some sources more heavily than others.  Specifically, the sources that tend 
to be more highly correlated with the other sources are given greater weight, with the 
precise weights determined objectively by (a variant of) principal components analysis.  
The assumption is that if sources are independent of each other, a source that agrees less 
with the others is a less accurate measure of corruption – whether due to pure 
measurement error (the source is deficient in measuring what it purports to measure) or 
due to extraneous content (e.g. if a source’s assessment criteria include factors other than 
corruption).
22  The rationale for such a procedure disappears however if measurement 
error is correlated among sources, i.e. if they are not independent.  If high correlations 
among expert assessments are driven by the fact that they consult each other’s ratings – 
or even by experts all basing their ratings on the same information sources - agreement 
among them is a dubious proxy for their accuracy.  In that case, any truly independent 
source will appear to be relatively inaccurate: using different information or a different 
                                                 
22 For example, the criteria for the corruption indicator from Business Environmental Risk Intelligence 
(BERI) include “xenophobia.”  The WBI index includes it, but TI excludes it based on this extraneous 
content.  The authors of the WBI index emphasize measurement error rather than conceptual mismatch as 
their justification for weighting more heavily the sources correlated more strongly with others.   25
methodology, it is likely to generate ratings less correlated with the interdependent expert 
ratings than the latter are with each other.   
The BEEPS is a good illustration of this problem.  In the WBI indexes for 2002 
and 2004, the weight given to Nations in Transit (covering mostly the same countries) is 
24 times the weight given to the BEEPS.  As one “expert”-based source among many in 
the index, it is unsurprising that Nations in Transit tends to be more highly correlated 
than a firm survey with most other sources.  More defensible than the assumption that all 
sources are independent would be an assumption that the types of sources listed in Table 
1 are (largely) independent.  This more conservative assumption would suggest giving 
equal weight to each type of source available for a given country, e.g. 1/4 each to firm 
surveys, household surveys, decentralized and centralized expert ratings. 
Interdependence of expert sources can even undermine the main premise of the 
WBI index methodology that more information – more sources – produces more accurate 
and reliable estimates.  The addition of another expert-based source containing little new 
information - relying on the same information sources as its competitors, or even 
checking their ratings - can reduce accuracy of the composite index, by further reducing 
the weight given to the few sources that do provide truly independent information.
23  
The availability of the composite indexes themselves can aggravate these 
problems.  Some expert-based sources providing broad assessments of corruption may, 
sensibly enough, agree with the premise underlying the TI and WBI indexes that more 
information is better, and adjust their ratings to conform better to the composites’ 
rankings.  The ICRG appears to have done this in late 2001.  It publishes monthly 
                                                 
23 Any additional source receiving a positive weight inevitably must reduce the collective weight of 
previous sources.  However, addition of a non-independent source will reduce disproportionately the 
weight given to an independent source, by reducing the latter’s average agreement with the other sources.   26
corruption ratings, but in most months very few ratings are changed.  September to 
October 2001 was typical, with a single ½ point change for Switzerland.  From October 
to November, however, 47 ratings were reduced and 10 increased.  Such a dramatic 
reassessment had not occurred in the ICRG either before (dating back to 1984) or since.  
As shown in Figure 1, the month-to-month correlations in ICRG always exceed .99, but 
fell to .88 in November 2001.  Although the ICRG has not responded to repeated requests 
for an explanation for this break in the data, there is some evidence that ratings were re-
adjusted to conform much more closely to the TI rankings.  As shown in Figure 1, the 
ICRG ratings were correlated with the TI 2001 ratings (released at end of June 2001) at 
only .72.  However, the correlation with TI rose to .91 with the massive re-calibration by 
ICRG in November.
24  This evidence of interdependence between TI and ICRG does not 
directly present a problem for the TI index, which does not include ICRG as a source.  It 
does imply a circularity problem for WBI, however, which uses ICRG and most of the TI 
sources.
25  It also indirectly suggests a problem for TI (and WBI), to the extent that ICRG 
may not be unique among sources in sometimes free riding on the assessments of other 
sources - including the TI and WBI indexes themselves - rather than basing assessments 
on their own independent information.
26    
Fortunately, correlation with other sources is not the only proxy for accuracy that 
could be used in assigning differential weights in index construction.  Some more 
                                                 
24 Over the last four years, this correlation has gradually declined and recently was at .79.  
25 This problem is relatively minor, as the WBI index uses many other sources in addition to the ICRG and 
those used by TI. 
26 Surowiecki (2004) makes an analogous argument that more information of the wrong kind can contribute 
to stock market bubbles and crashes.  The advent of cable television and the Internet, including particularly 
CNBC, “magnified the dependent nature of the stock market because it bombarded investors with news 
about what other investors were thinking.”  A “herd mentality becomes endemic” as investors cease to 
make independent judgments about asset values, and the efficiency gains from aggregating information 
from large numbers of investors is lost.    27
plausible weighting schemes for a broadly-defined composite index of corruption 
include:  
•  Weight more heavily those sources that represent truly independent 
assessments.  The BEEPS would thereby receive a greater weight than 
WEF or ICRG.  Weighting each type of source equally, as suggested 
above, is consistent with this reasoning. 
•  Weight more heavily those sources with more extensive publicly available 
documentation (particularly regarding assessment criteria and 
methodology) and detailed justifications.  Nations in Transit would 
thereby receive a greater weight than EIU.  
•  Among survey sources, weight more heavily those with larger and more 
nationally representative samples, and those that include more questions 
on corruption.  The WEF – with many more corruption questions - would 
thus be weighted more heavily than the IMD.  
•  Weight indicators based on conceptual grounds; e.g. if an equal mix of 
administrative corruption and “state capture” is desired but most available 
indicators pertain to the former, weight more heavily those that pertain to 
the latter. 
 
A disadvantage to most of these weighting schemes is that weights would be determined 
subjectively, in contrast to the objectively-determined weights in the WBI methodology.  
The larger point is that no one of these weighting choices is likely to be the most 
appropriate for all purposes to which an aggregate index might be applied.  Greater 
public access to the underlying data used in the TI and WBI indexes, along with better 
information on how those underlying data are generated, would permit data users to 
customize their own indexes more appropriate to their own purposes.   
4. Levels and Trends in Corruption for ECA Countries 
With the review of corruption indicators in section 3 as background, this section 
reports evidence from BEEPS and other sources on corruption trends between 2002 and 
2005.  We compare ECA to other regions, and compare ECA countries to each other.  
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the corruption variables included in both the 2002   28
and 2005 BEEPS.
27  Figures reported represent means (or proportions, in the last two 
columns), weighting each of the 27 countries equally.
28   
The most dramatic improvement between 2002 and 2005 is in the “bribe tax,” 
which fell by one-third from 1.6% of firm revenues to 1.1%.  The bribe tax reported is 
skewed across firms, with a majority of firms reporting 0% in both years.  A positive 
value for “bribe tax” was reported by 44% of firms in 2002, declining to 37% in 2005.
29  
Among the numerous other questions on corruption issues in the BEEPS, most 
show evidence of modest improvement.  For example, corruption was cited as a major or 
moderate obstacle to doing business by 21% of firms on average in 2002, falling to about 
18% in 2005.  About 26% of firms on average in 2002 reported that paying bribes was 
frequently, usually or always necessary “to get things done with regard to customs, taxes, 
licenses” etc., down to 20% in 2005.  Most questions about specific public services also 
show evidence of declines in the incidence of bribe paying, e.g. in getting connected to 
public utilities, in obtaining licenses, and in paying taxes and customs.    
A few corruption items in the BEEPS show slight deteriorations over time for the 
region overall.  Bribe-paying in obtaining government contracts and in dealing with 
courts appears to have increased very slightly between 2002 and 2005.      
                                                 
27 Based on BEEPS 2005 data, Anderson and Gray (2006) report corruption levels for 2005, and changes 
between 2002 and 2005.  Using BEEPS 2002 data, Gray, Hellman and Ryterman (2004) report corruption 
levels for 2002, and changes between 1999 and 2002.  Fewer changes in BEEPS contents and methods 
occurred in the 2005 survey than in the 2002 survey, making over-time comparisons for 2002 and 2005 
more reliable than comparisons between 1999 and 2002.  For example, the “bribe tax” question was 
worded differently in 1999 and 2002, but identically in 2002 and 2005.  Serbia/Montenegro and Tajikistan 
were added to the survey in 2002, so can be included in comparisons of BEEPS II and III, but not of 
BEEPS I and II. 
28 Only 26 countries are included in the “bribe tax” comparison, as there were problems with data for 
Turkey in 2005. 
29 The question asked “what percent of total annual sales do firms like yours typically pay,” which should 
elicit more candid responses than if it were phrased specifically in terms of the respondent’s firm.    29
There is little evidence of change overall in three survey items on “state capture.”  
Paying bribes “to influence the content of new legislation, rules or decrees” appears to be 
about equally common in both years.  Similarly, the share of firms reporting a significant 
impact on their business from Parliamentarians receiving bribes to affect their votes is 
little changed.
30  A slight improvement is evident for a similar question on payments to 
Government officials to affect the content of government decrees.   
Overall, Table 2 indicates notable progress between 2002 and 2005 in 
administrative corruption, but not in state capture.  Moreover, while most areas of 
administrative corruption show improvement, progress appears to be uneven and even 
absent in a couple of important areas, such as the courts. 
This overall progress also hides uneven progress across countries.
31  Country-
level data on four BEEPS measures are reported in Tables 3 and 4.  Table 3 shows 
country-level means for bribe tax (Q40), bribe frequency (Q39a), costs of state capture 
(Q44b, on payments to government officials to influence rulemaking), and corruption as a 
serious obstacle to doing business (Q54q).
32  Figures in parentheses show ranks, for 2002 
and 2005 respectively, among the BEEPS countries.  Table 4 shows the average change 
over time for the same four variables, and in parentheses shows ranks in terms of change, 
with “1” showing the largest improvement and “27” the largest deterioration. 
                                                 
30 The question does not specify whether the “private payments/gifts” to Parliamentarians were paid by the 
firm or by other firms, but simply refers to the “impact on your business” from such practices.  Survey 
questions are printed in full in Appendix B.  
31 Detailed country-by-country results are reported in Anderson and Gray (2006), which also contains 
several short case studies on corruption successes (Georgia) and failures (Kyrgyz Republic). 
32 These four were selected from the larger set primarily for their prominent use in Gray, Hellman, and 
Ryterman (2004).  Several of the “state capture” variables they used were not included in the 2005 BEEPS; 
among the remaining state capture items Q44b was selected because firms cited it more frequently than 
Q44a (on payments to Parliamentarians), and it is correlated most highly with an overall index of the three 
state capture measures in the 2005 BEEPS.     30
The multidimensionality of corruption is apparent from these tables, suggesting 
the difficulty in concluding that “corruption is worse” in country X than in country Y.  
Macedonia ranked 5
th in “bribe tax” in 2005, but 27
th on corruption as an obstacle to 
doing business.  Latvia ranks 4
th on bribe frequency and 20
th on state capture.  However, 
the various measures are significantly and positively correlated, and there are some 
countries that rank consistently high or low across measures.  Slovenia ranks 1
st on three 
measures and 3
rd on the other measure.  Estonia ranks 2
nd on three measures, and 6
th on 
the other one.  Albania ranks 24
th or worse on all four measures.  Azerbaijan never ranks 
higher than 20
th, and Kyrgyz never higher than 21
st.   
A second pattern concerns changes over time.  Different measures often move in 
opposite directions for a given country.  Georgia is among the few countries showing 
largest improvements on all four measures, while Azerbaijan was among those showing 
large deteriorations on all four variables.  If changes were independent across the four 
variables, we would expect only about three countries to show either only positive, or 
only negative, changes on all four measures.  In fact, 9 countries show decreasing 
corruption on all four measures, and 2 others show increasing corruption on all four.  
Other than Georgia, the most striking cases of improvements in corruption are for Slovak 
Republic, Romania and Bulgaria.  Slovenia and Estonia also show impressive 
improvement, given that they already had relatively low levels of corruption in 2002, as 
measured by all four indicators.  Azerbaijan and Lithuania exhibit increasing corruption 
on all four measures.  Kyrgyz Republic’s deterioration on three of the measures must also 
be considered disappointing, despite a large improvement in the bribe tax from a region-
worst 3.7% in 2002 to a second-worst 2.5% in 2005.     31
Trends in other data sources 
Three key distinctions should be kept in mind in comparing trends from BEEPS 
to trends in other assessments of corruption, for 2002 to 2005.  First, most other sources 
do not “unbundle” corruption across various functions of government, but provide only a 
single broadly-defined indicator.  Second, broadly-defined indicators from other sources 
will differ from BEEPS in their inclusion of other aspects of corruption, in addition to 
corruption in firm-state interactions.  Third, most other sources are designed primarily to 
compare corruption levels across countries, and only secondarily to compare corruption 
levels over time within countries.  Although such sources are not very informative on 
whether corruption is improving or deteriorating for ECA or other regions, they can still 
be used to compare relative performance.  Namely, they can help answer the question of 
whether ECA overall is improving relative to other regions. 
Nations in Transit (NIT) covers only the 27 transition countries in ECA; Turkey 
is excluded.  On the 1-7 NIT corruption scale, a 1 is the best possible rating and a 7 is the 
worst, with quarter-point increments allowed.  The mean rating improved from 4.85 in 
2002 to 4.80 in 2005.  This small average improvement hides substantial variation 
however: ratings improved for 10 countries, mostly in Eastern Europe, and deteriorated 
for 7 others, mostly in the former Soviet republics - although the two largest, Russia and 
Ukraine, show small improvements.   
The CPIA question, “Transparency, Accountability and Corruption in the Public 
Sector,” is assessed on a 1-6 scale for 27 ECA countries.
33 in 2002 was 3.11, increasing 
                                                 
33 Slovenia was a 28
th ECA country in the CPIA until it “graduated” in 2003.  It is therefore excluded from 
comparisons here.   32
to 3.30 in the 2004 ratings.
34  As shown in Table 6, most regions show modest 
improvement over time, but the increase for ECA was exceeded in magnitude only by the 
East Asia and Pacific region.  Among all 134 countries in the CPIA in both 2002 and 
2005, the average ranking for ECA countries was 64
th in 2002, improving to 61
st in 2005.  
In 2002, the mean rating for ECA was third-highest among regions, behind Latin 
America and South Asia.  In 2004, ECA ranked behind only Latin America.   
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rated 140 countries, including 
21 ECA countries, in June 2002 and March 2005.  The ICRG is updated monthly, and 
data for those months were selected to coincide with the beginning of fieldwork for the 
BEEPS II and III.  Unlike the CPIA, the ICRG sample includes most developed 
countries.  Its corruption ratings range from a minimum value of 0 to a maximum of 6.  
The mean ECA rating increased from about 2.1 in 2002 to 2.2 in 2005.  The average 
ranking for the 21 ECA countries also improved over the period, from 82
nd to 76
th.   
The World Economic Forum data (WEF) included only 14 ECA countries 
among a total of 79 with available data for both 2002 and 2005.  These 79 include many 
developed countries.  Table 5 reports on nine WEF variables, all scaled from a low value 
of 1 to a high value of 7.  Trends in these nine are highly mixed.  The first four in the 
table, pertaining mostly to state capture, all show either stagnation or deterioration.  In 
particular, the average rating for ECA countries on “business costs of corruption” – 
defined in terms of “other firms’ illegal payments to influence government policies, laws 
or regulations” – worsens from 4.5 to 4.1.  The average ranking for ECA on this question 
fell from 45
th in 2002 to 51
st in 2005.   
                                                 
34 The 2004 ratings were produced in late 2004 and early 2005, so provide a better comparison than the 
2005 ratings (finalized in early 2006) with the 2005 BEEPS.  The 2002 CPIA ratings were produced in mid 
and late 2002, so provide the best match with the 2002 BEEPS.    33
Trends are much more favorable on five measures of administrative corruption in 
the WEF.  The average ECA ranking improves on all five of these measures, although its 
average rating on the 7-point scale fell from 4.8 to 4.4 on one of them, “irregular 
payments in judicial decisions.”   
This evidence from the WEF is remarkably consistent with the BEEPS in two 
major respects.  First, there is evidence of improvement in administrative corruption, but 
not in state capture.  Second, both sources “unbundle” administrative corruption in 
similar ways, finding more evidence of improvement for certain functions (licenses and 
permits, tax and customs, utilities) than for others (public contracts, judicial system). 
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) assigns countries to one of five 
categories, with a 1 for the least corrupt, and a 5 for the most corrupt.  The average for 20 
ECA countries included in the 2002 and 2005 ratings improved from 3.10 to 2.95.  In 
contrast, the average for 63 other World Bank borrowers deteriorated from 3.21 to 3.28.  
The number of ECA countries with changes in their EIU corruption rating is small, as 
might be expected on a scale with only five categories.  Corruption improvements were 
recorded for Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Turkey, with Poland worsening, in all cases 
by only one category. 
Both of the widely-known composite indexes of corruption show slight 
improvements for ECA relative to non-ECA countries.  Among 152 countries (including 
most developed nations) with TI index values for both 2002 and 2005, the average 
ranking among the 28 ECA countries increased from 92
nd to 88
th.
35  Of course, evidence 
                                                 
35 The TI index provided on TI’s official web site lists somewhat fewer countries, namely only those for 
which at least three data sources were available.  Johann Lambsdorff lists additional countries for which 
only one or two data sources were available, on the web site of the Internet Center for Corruption Research 
(http://www.icgg.org/).   34
from the TI index is at least partly redundant, because it includes the WEF, NIT and EIU 
measures discussed above.   
The WBI index is constructed only for even-numbered years, so comparisons 
were made only over the period 2002-2004.  Even over this shorter period, the average 
ranking for the 28 ECA countries improved from 111
th to 106
th.  As with the TI index, 
evidence from the WBI index should not be interpreted as being fully independent from 
some of the trends reported above.  The WBI index includes WEF, NIT, the CPIA, the 
ICRG, the EIU and the BEEPS.  However, both the 2002 and 2004 WBI indexes use the 
same 2002 data from BEEPS, in theory imparting a status quo bias in WBI ratings for 
ECA countries.  In practice, however, any bias is trivial, as the weight assigned to the 
BEEPS data by the WBI methodology is extraordinarily small in both 2002 and 2004.
36   
Although the various data sources agree with each other – and with the BEEPS 
evidence - that corruption has tended to decline for ECA overall, there is less agreement 
on which countries in the region experienced the most improvement.  Table 7 shows very 
modest correlations in changes from 2002 to 2005 among the expert-based assessments; 
not all of them are even of the “correct” sign.  A closer look at the data reveals that:  
•  In ICRG, the largest increases from 2002 to 2005 were for Russia and 
Serbia/Montenegro (both from 1 to 2 on the 0-6 scale).  Czech Republic 
showed a decline from 3 to 2.5.  Poland and Hungary were unchanged.  
•  In NIT, the only improvement of ½ point or greater were all in the 
Balkans: Bosnia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania.  Poland and Belarus 
had the largest deterioration, of ¾ point.  Czech Republic and Hungary 
improved by ¼ point. 
•  The CPIA, consistent with NIT, showed improvements in the Balkans, but 
also showed increases for Belarus and Tajikistan.  Czech Republic 
increased by ½ point, while ratings were reduced for Hungary and Poland. 
                                                 
36 The BEEPS weight is about one-sixth the weight given to WEF or ICRG, and less than 1/20
th the weight 
given to Nations in Transit.  In fact, the WBI corruption index is correlated with NIT at .96.   35
•  The EIU, consistent with NIT and CPIA, shows deterioration for Poland.  
The four countries with improving ratings overlap little if at all, however, 
with the countries showing improvement in ICRG, NIT and CPIA.  
 
These changes appear to be inconsistent, perhaps sufficiently so to cast doubt on 
the argument that expert-based assessments consult each other’s ratings, or are otherwise 
based on very similar information.  A partial answer to this puzzle is that ratings changes 
in expert-based systems do not always reflect a belief that actual conditions have 
changed, but often are intended to correct a previous year’s rating that in retrospect 
appears too high or too low.   
“Regression to the mean” is commonplace among these corruption indicators.  
When ratings changes from 2002-2005 are regressed on initial (2002) levels, the 
coefficient on initial levels is negative and highly significant.  This pattern holds for the 
ICRG and CPIA, and for most BEEPS and WEF measures.  It does not hold for NIT or 
EIU; in those cases the coefficient on initial values is near 0 and does not approach 
statistical significance.  The declines in NIT are concentrated in the former Soviet 
republics, which were already rated in 2002 as more corrupt than the European countries 
in ECA.   
Regression-to-the-mean is exemplified by the cases of Czech Republic and 
Poland.  The decrease for Czech Republic by ICRG appears inconsistent with its 
improvement in NIT and CPIA.  But the ICRG in 2002 ranked it higher among ECA 
countries than the other sources did.  Ratings changes for Czech Republic reflect a 
convergence in assessments among those three sources, and with the WEF and BEEPS 
data, which also tend to place Czech in the upper half of the ECA rankings, but not 
among the top 5 or 6.     36
Poland was ranked 2
nd-best in NIT, tied for 2
nd-best in CPIA, and tied for 1
st in the 
EIU among ECA countries in 2002.  It ranked in the middle of the pack in ICRG in both 
2002 and 2005, and tends to rank just above the middle on most WEF and BEEPS 
measures.  Poland’s downgrading in NIT left it tied (with Slovakia) for 4
th; its 
downgrading in CPIA left it in a tie for 6
th  (with three other countries), and its 
downgrading by EIU put it in the middle ranks, tied with three other countries, behind 
eight others and ahead of eight others. 
If these examples of converging assessments are more the rule than the exception, 
one would expect inter-correlations among these expert sources to be higher in 2005 than 
in 2002.  The data confirm this prediction: the mean of the six inter-correlations among 
ICRG, NIT, CPIA and EIU increases form .78 in 2002 to .85 in 2005. 
A second prediction is that some of the weak correlations in changes among 
sources will strengthen, when we control for initial levels.  As shown in Table 7, changes 
in EIU are completely uncorrelated with changes in ICRG and CPIA.  However, in 
multivariate regressions, the EIU change is found to be significantly correlated with the 
ICRG change controlling for initial (2002) levels of EIU and ICRG.  A similar result is 
obtained in another regression substituting CPIA for ICRG.  
In summary, other sources tend to agree with evidence from the BEEPS that 
corruption in the region declined from 2002 to 2005.  The various sources often disagree 
on which countries experienced improvement or deterioration.  Part of this inconsistency 
is only apparent, however, as disagreement among sources on direction of changes often 
is necessary to achieve greater convergence in levels.  Any convergence of this sort 
represents a likely reduction in measurement error.  A more fundamental explanation for   37
apparent disagreement among corruption indicators – in levels or changes or time – is 
that they do not all purport to measure exactly the same concept.  These differences are 
easily seen in the definitions in Appendix A.  Most notably, perhaps, the CPIA attempts 
to measure not only corruption in the public sector, but also “transparency and 
accountability.” 
5. What Aspects of Corruption are the Broad Indicators Measuring?  
The prevalence and conceptual variety of corruption measures in the 2005 BEEPS 
and WEF surveys can be exploited to identify which aspects of corruption are best 
captured by broader, perception-based measures - including the BEEPS question on 
corruption as an obstacle to doing business.  Table 8 reports correlations of NIT, ICRG, 
CPIA, EIU, the BEEPS “obstacle” question, and the TI and WBI composite indexes with 
a comprehensive set of corruption measures included in the BEEPS and WEF.
37   
The assessment criteria for NIT, ICRG and CPIA reflect roughly equal mixtures 
of administrative corruption and state capture, while the extremely brief criteria for EIU 
(“how pervasive is corruption by public officials?”) is consistent with both types.  The 
correlations with BEEPS variables reported in Table 8 suggest, however, that all of these 
sources – particularly the CPIA – are measuring primarily administrative corruption.  
Among the various BEEPS measures, bribes in business licenses and permits and in tax 
collection are most strongly correlated with the broadly-defined corruption measures 
from other sources.  None of the four broad indicators is strongly correlated with bribes 
                                                 
37 These correlations are limited to ECA countries.  The larger sample of WEF countries could be used to 
compute correlations with most of these indicators (all but BEEPS “obstacle” and NIT). 
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for influencing legislation, or with measures of the impacts on business of bribing to 
affect Parliamentary votes or government decrees.   
Correlations of NIT, ICRG, CPIA and EIU with the various WEF firm survey 
corruption variables show a broadly similar pattern.  Each of those four is strongly 
correlated with bribes for utility connections, exports and imports, and tax collection.  
Their correlations with a WEF measure of favoritism in decision making are more 
modest.  There is one state capture measure in WEF, however, which is strongly 
correlated with the four broad indicators: the WEF question on “business costs of 
corruption,” defined in terms of other firms’ illegal payments to influence government 
laws and policies.  With this single exception, data from the two firm surveys indicate 
that NIT, ICRG, CPIA and EIU are measuring administrative corruption much better than 
the measure state capture. 
A striking finding from the BEEPS and WEF data is the absence of any 
significant link between corruption in public procurement and the broad, perception-
based measures.  Of the 12 correlations between three firm-survey variables on bribery in 
procurement on the one hand, and the four broad indicators on the other, the highest 
correlation is .27.  The third-strongest of these 12 correlations (between CPIA and a 
BEEPS measure) even has a perverse sign.   
This weak relationship could be attributable in part to lack of good information, if 
most firms never sell their products or services to government agencies.  Accordingly, we 
re-calculated the two BEEPS items on corruption in public procurement, deleting the 
roughly four-fifths of firms in the sample reporting no sales to their government.    39
Correlations with a few of the broad perception-based measures strengthen somewhat, 
but remain far weaker than any of the other administrative-corruption correlations. 
Two WEF variables measure business executives’ perceptions of other aspects of 
corruption that pertain less to state-enterprise interactions, and more to misappropriation 
of taxpayer funds by government officials.  One of these is titled “diversion of public 
funds,” and the other “public trust in the financial honesty of politicians.”  Diversion of 
funds is most strongly correlated with EIU (.66), among the four expert-based indicators. 
It is most weakly correlated (.42) with CPIA - despite the fact that of the four only the 
CPIA explicitly includes diversion of funds in its definition.  Public trust in honesty of 
politicians is correlated at .44 with ICRG, but only at .04 for CPIA.   
The dimensions of corruption that present the largest obstacles to doing business 
are of course likely to vary not only across countries, but also across firms within a 
country.  Gray, Hellman and Ryterman (2004) use BEEPS II data to run country-specific, 
cross-firm regressions of the “obstacle” measure on several administrative corruption 
measures (also from the BEEPS), among other regressors.  In some countries, they find 
bribes paid in dealing with courts to be a significant obstacle, while in others bribes paid 
to obtain business licenses are significant.  The 5
th column of results in Table 6 is a 
cruder look into what forms of corruption appear most often to represent a serious 
obstacle, using the BEEPS III data.  Unlike Gray, Hellman and Ryterman (2004), it does 
not disaggregate by country, or control for other variables.  With those caveats, the broad 
perceptions measure of corruption in BEEPS – the “obstacle” measure – is found to be 
correlated more strongly, on average, with the state capture questions in BEEPS, and to a 
lesser extent in WEF, than with their administrative corruption questions.  These findings   40
are in stark contrast to those reported above for NIT, ICRG, CPIA and EIU.  Among all 
of the WEF and BEEPS indicators, the “obstacle” variable is most highly correlated (.83) 
with the WEF “diversion of public funds.”  This result is somewhat surprising, as firms 
are not well-placed to have first-hand knowledge on diversion of public funds, in contrast 
to their frontline position with respect to many forms of administrative corruption, state 
capture and procurement fraud. 
The EIU and ICRG indicators are produced by commercial firms specializing in 
assessing risk to overseas investors.  They might therefore focus on assessing corruption 
conditions faced by foreign-owned companies, which may sometimes differ from those 
faced by domestically-owned firms.  Accordingly, we re-calculated all of the country-
level BEEPS corruption measures using only the 12% of firms that were majority 
foreign-owned.  On average, the EIU indicator is no more highly correlated with these 
BEEPS measures than with those calculated using all firms.  If conditions facing foreign 
owned firms are different, the EIU does not appear to measure those differences 
effectively.  Most correlations between BEEPS questions and ICRG, however, are higher 
(by .05 on average, in absolute value) when BEEPS measures are calculated only for 
firms that are majority foreign-owned.  The correlations with ICRG strengthen the most 
for BEEPS questions on bribes paid for utility connections, and for environmental, health 
and safety inspections.  Bribe frequency for foreign-owned firms is no different on 
average than for other firms, but the average bribe tax they report is slightly lower. 
The correlations of broadly-defined corruption measures with more specific 
questions in the BEEPS and WEF firm surveys described above can help reveal what 
information underlies subjective judgments regarding corruption.  Correlations of the   41
composite indexes with BEEPS and WEF, reported in the final two columns of Table 8, 
must be interpreted differently.  Many of the firm survey variables are correlated by 
construction with the composite indexes; these correlations are shown in bold in Table 8.   
The WEF administrative corruption variables – in the bottom five in Table 8 - are 
part of the TI index.  Not surprisingly, they are more strongly correlated with TI than are 
the other WEF variables, and the BEEPS variables, which are not components of TI.   
Because the WEF administrative corruption variables enter the TI index as three 
separate sources – for the three most recent annual surveys – the overall TI index is likely 
to emphasize administrative corruption more than state capture.  Therefore, we can 
expect the administrative corruption measures in BEEPS to be more strongly correlated 
than the BEEPS state capture measures with TI, even though BEEPS is not a component 
of the TI index.  That is in fact what we find in Table 8.  Correlations of TI with the three 
state capture variables in BEEPS range from .11 to .28.  Correlations with TI exceed .40 
for 7 of the 9 BEEPS administrative corruption measures, with the highest for tax 
collection (.66) and business licenses (.70). 
For WBI - in marked contrast to TI - variables included in the index are no more 
highly correlated with it than are variables excluded from the index.  The two BEEPS 
variables most highly correlated with WBI (and with TI) are bribe frequency in the areas 
of business licenses and permits, and in tax collection.  Neither of these variables is a 
component of the WBI index, however.  State capture measures in BEEPS are even more 
weakly correlated with WBI than with TI, despite the fact that some of them are 
components of WBI (unlike the case for TI).  Although they are components, their weight 
is extraordinarily small, only 1/24
th of the weight given to NIT in the 2004 WBI index.    42
Due to this huge weight for NIT, the correlation of WBI with NIT is .96; it is not 
surprising therefore that results in Table 8 for WBI closely mirror those for NIT, but with 
the signs reversed.  
Corruption in public procurement, as measured by two BEEPS questions, has a 
near zero correlation with the TI and WBI indexes.  The WEF question on “irregular 
payments” needed to obtain public contracts is a component of both the TI and WBI 
indexes, so it is moderately correlated with them.  But correlations of both indexes are far 
higher for the other four WEF “irregular payments” questions related to administrative 
corruption.  These may be the most noteworthy findings from this exercise, as graft in 
public procurement receives more publicity than any other aspects of corruption.  Media 
reports on procurement fraud in a country are often accompanied by references to its TI 
ranking.  Corruption in procurement - as reported in firm surveys - has little to do with 
rankings on TI and WBI, however.   
Factor analysis is an alternative approach for analyzing the content of broad 
corruption indicators.  A factor analysis of 12 BEEPS variables (all but the first five listed 
in Table 8) yields two significant factors (i.e., with eigenvalues exceeding one) that 
together explaining 85% of the variation in the data.  One of these is clearly identifiable 
as a “state capture” factor: the three variables on unofficial payments to influence 
legislation and rules all load most heavily on it (Q41j, Q44a, Q44b).  The second factor 
reflects administrative corruption: variables loading most heavily on it include payments 
to obtain business licenses (Q41b), to deal with fire and building inspections (Q41e), and 
to deal with taxes and tax collection (Q41g).  Adding one of the more broadly-defined 
perceptions measures to these 13 in a factor analysis, we can observe which of these   43
factors it loads most heavily on, and infer which of these two major types of corruption it 
is best capturing.  
When NIT is added in the factor analysis, it has a large positive loading on the 
administrative corruption factor, but a small negative loading on the state capture factor.  
Very similar results are found if any of the other broadly-defined corruption indicators 
listed across the columns of table 8 is substituted for NIT.   
Factor analyses based on the 9 WEF variables in Table 8 produce similar findings 
to those based on BEEPS variables.  Two significant factors explain 95% of the variation.  
These factors are again clearly identifiable as state capture and administrative corruption, 
with the first four WEF variables listed in Table 8 loading most heavily on one factor, 
and the other five loading most heavily on the other.  Corruption measures from NIT, 
CPIA, TI and WBI all load mostly on the administrative corruption factor when any one 
of them is added as a 10
th variable.  The ICRG, EIU and the “obstacle” measure from 
BEEPS load more equally across the two factors, although still somewhat more strongly 
on administrative corruption than on state capture. 
The weak link between state capture measures in BEEPS and in broader 
perceptions-based indicators is due in part to Belarus and Uzbekistan.  These two 
countries are “outliers” in being rated lower by other sources than by most of the BEEPS 
questions, particularly those on state capture.  The first Anticorruption in Transition 
report (World Bank 2000) attributed low levels of state capture in Belarus and 
Uzbekistan to their relatively small private sectors and “the continued existence of 
authoritarian controls.”  The third report (Gray and Anderson, 2006) discusses in greater 
detail the possibility that corruption takes different forms, not easily measured by firm   44
surveys, in autocratic regimes.  Indeed, there is no necessary contradiction between 
infrequent bribery of public officials by firms (i.e., relatively good performance on 
BEEPS) on the one hand, and excessive state involvement in the economy, absence of 
protection for whistleblowers and journalists, etc. on the other (i.e., a poor rating on NIT; 
see Appendix B for criteria).
38   
Omitting Belarus and Uzbekistan, correlations of NIT and CPIA with the BEEPS 
state capture measures (and with its “obstacle” measure) are somewhat stronger than 
those reported in Table 8.  Belarus is not covered by EIU, and Uzbekistan is not covered 
by ICRG, and results for those sources change by less when those countries are deleted.  
Neither Belarus nor Uzbekistan is included in the WEF sample, so none of the 
correlations reported in the lower part of Table 8 are affected by their deletion.  The 
factor analysis using WEF data also indicated that the broadly-defined corruption 
indicators were mostly measuring administrative corruption rather than state capture.  
Even without these two countries, therefore, the evidence indicates that the broad 
measures reflect administrative corruption much more than they reflect state capture.  
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The BEEPS and other sources of corruption data indicate that corruption in ECA 
overall is declining.  The sources appear to differ somewhat on the magnitude of this 
decline, with the BEEPS indicating a more favorable trend.  Discrepancies in magnitudes 
do not necessarily indicate inaccuracy in one or more sources, however, because of 
differences in the (explicit or implicit) definition of corruption.  The BEEPS and WEF 
each contains multiple items on administrative corruption and state capture, and both 
                                                 
38 Regardless of the prevalence of bribery or other forms of corruption, it may be unrealistic to expect 
Nations in Transit – a product of Freedom House, funded in part by the U.S. government and conservative 
American philanthropists – to rate autocratic regimes highly on any indicator.   45
sources show much more evidence of improvement in the former than in the latter.  
Unbundling administrative corruption, both sources exhibit reductions in bribe paying in 
utility connections, tax collection, and in importing and exporting, little change in the 
area of public procurement, and an increase in corruption in dealing with courts.   
The various data sources disagree somewhat on which countries in the region 
have experienced the most progress.  The BEEPS shows dramatic improvement in 
Georgia between 2002 and 2005, but no other source corroborates it.  Expert assessments 
show more progress for other countries, particularly in the Balkans, and the WEF did not 
include Georgia in its 2002 surveys.  There is some evidence of convergence in 
assessments of the various sources between 2002 and 2005, which can account in part for 
apparent inconsistencies across sources on which countries are experiencing 
improvements.  To some extent, these discrepancies in changes – as with levels - may be 
explained by differences in how different sources define corruption.  As Gray, Hellman 
and Ryterman (2000: 50) conclude from the BEEPS I and II data: “One cannot simply 
say that corruption is going up or down in individual countries, as we find a complex web 
of movements and mutations across different forms, features and dimensions of 
corruption.  We need to be cautious and modest and to constantly recognize the full 
complexity of the measurement effort.”   
Gray, Hellman and Ryterman (2000: 40) attribute part of the decline in corruption 
measured in BEEPS I and II to optimism, perhaps associated with relatively strong 
economic performance.  Continued favorable economic conditions may similarly play 
some role in the improvements measured by BEEPS II and III.  Expert ratings can also be 
affected by recent economic performance: other things equal one might infer that   46
corruption must not be too severe if growth is strong.  The Bangladeshi case suggests that 
such inferences are not paramount in making assessments; it routinely ranks at the bottom 
of the TI index, despite experiencing fairly rapid growth in recent years.  For small 
countries, however, on which experts tend to have less information, corruption 
assessments may rely more heavily on proxies such as economic conditions, or type of 
political regime.  More research is needed concerning the impact of optimism, recent 
economic performance, and recent corruption scandals on country-level corruption 
indicators, of the expert-assessment type as well as firm and household surveys. 
More research is also needed inquiring into the actual content of commonly-used 
indicators, as distinct from their purported content.  The criteria for several sources 
(including ICRG, CPIA, and NIT) place great weight on state capture, but appear to be 
measuring primarily administrative corruption.  Evidence in this paper is based solely on 
the ECA region, but this issue could be examined further using the full WEF sample.   
The conceptual and methodological discussions, as well as empirical evidence 
reported here form BEEPS and other sources, strongly support the message that no single 
corruption measure, nor single data source on corruption, is most appropriate for all 
purposes.  Expert ratings are defined too vaguely and broadly-and constructed too non-
transparently - to be suitable for some purposes.  For example, it is difficult to hold 
governments responsible for improving their scores on such measures, as a condition for 
receiving aid, if there is little indication of how scores can be improved.   
Composite indexes of corruption should be used with more caution by 
development agencies and by researchers, recognizing that their conceptual breadth 
makes them appropriate for some purposes but not for others.  There should be more   47
examination of the criteria and methods of their underlying sources, to better understand 
what they are measuring, and to determine (roughly) their degree of interdependence.  
Depending on one’s purposes, customized indexes based on a subset of the TI or WBI 
components might be more appropriate.  Also, the weights used by TI and WBI are 
essentially arbitrary, particularly when it is acknowledged that many of the data sources 
are highly interdependent.  If the underlying data were made more accessible, data users 
could choose the weights they deem appropriate for their purposes, in customizing an 
index.  They could also compare two countries, or two time periods within a country, 
using only data sources common to both.  All users of the composite indexes and their 
perceptions-based components should follow TI’s example and acknowledge that these 
are measures of corruption perceptions, not of corruption.  
In comparison to broad expert assessments, a virtue of BEEPS (and WEF) is 
“unbundling” corruption in a large set of survey questions.  Firm-level analyses, e.g. on 
firm characteristics associated with different forms of corruption, can also be conducting 
using BEEPS, although not with WEF.  An important limitation of firm surveys such as 
BEEPS however is that it “provides a very incomplete measurement of corruption” 
(Gray, Hellman, and Ryterman, 2000: 54) by measuring only interactions between firms 
and public officials. 
To improve on the existing set of country-level corruption indicators, more data 
collection is needed on several margins.  First, the BEEPS should be replicated for other 
regions.  The World Bank, in partnership with some of the regional development banks, 
is already working towards this goal.  Second, firm surveys should be complemented by 
more systematic household surveys measuring experiences with corruption and other   48
governance problems.  Transparency International’s “Global Corruption Barometer” is a 
promising development in this regard, but conducting nationally-representative surveys 
of households remains a severe challenge in many developing countries.  Third, public 
officials surveys (sporadically conducted by the Bank in a small number of countries) 
should be standardized and scaled up, with a focus on assessing aspects of public sector 
corruption and other governance deficiencies not manifested in either state-enterprise or 
state-household transactions.  Finally, existing efforts to collect data on laws and 
practices intended to prevent corruption should be scaled up, to provide more 
“actionable” indicators appropriate for monitoring reform commitment and progress.  
Promising developments in this area include the Public Integrity Index, the International 
Budget Project, and the PEFA indicators on public expenditure management.
39  
 
                                                 
39 Information on these initiatives can be found, respectively, at http://www.globalintegrity.org/, 
http://www.internationalbudget.org/, and http://www.pefa.org/.    49
Table 1: Major sources of cross-country corruption data  
 
Data sources  Examples 
Representative surveys of service users 
Firms  World Bank investment climate assessments 
(including BEEPS) 
 
WEF’s Executive Opinion Survey 
 
IMD’s executive opinion survey 
Households  International Crime Victim Surveys 
 
New Democracy Barometer, Afrobarometer, 
Asia Barometer, Latinobarometer 
 
World Values Surveys 
 
Global Corruption Barometer (TI) 
 




Nations in Transit (Freedom House)  
 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
 
Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU)  
 
World Markets Research Centre (WMRC) 
 
World Bank CPIA 
surveys of “well-
informed persons”  
within country  
UNECA African Governance Indicators 
 
World Governance Assessments 
Composite indexes 
aggregation from 
various sources  
TI corruption perceptions index  
 
WBI control of corruption index 
   50
Table 2 






% 2002  % 2005 
  % of sales  % greater than 0 
Bribe  tax  (Q40)  1.59 1.05 43.6 36.8 
Kickback for govt. contract (Q42)  1.99  1.85  27.4  25.6 
  1-4 scale  % moderate or 
major obstacle 
Corruption problematic for business (Q54q)  2.24  2.14  21.0  17.8 
  1-6 scale  % frequently, 
usually or always 
Bribe frequency (Q39a)  2.61  2.35  25.6  20.3 
Bribe  predictability  (Q39b)  2.64 2.38 30.0 24.6 
Utilities (Q41a)  1.58  1.47  6.3  4.5 
Licenses & permits (Q41b)  2.08  2.01  15.9  13.9 
Government  contracts  (Q41c)  1.93 1.96 15.9 16.4 
Health/safety inspections (Q41d)  1.80  1.71  10.8  8.4 
Fire/building inspections (Q41e)  1.87  1.75  11.4  9.0 
Environmental inspections (Q41f)  1.67  1.56  7.9  6.0 
Taxes & tax collections (Q41g)  2.08  1.96  17.5  14.3 
Customs/imports  (Q41h)  1.90 1.73 15.4 11.5 
Courts (Q41i)  1.63  1.66  8.4  9.4 
Influence legislation/rules (Q41j)  1.42  1.41  5.0  4.7 
  1-5 scale  % moderate, major 
or decisive impact 
Impacted of capture: parliament (Q44a)  0.37  0.36  10.1  10.3 
Impact of capture: govt. officials  (Q44b)  0.44 0.38 12.4 11.6   51
Table 3 
Corruption levels in ECA, from 2005 BEEPS 
 
  Means or proportions* (2002, 2005 ranks in parentheses) 








Albania  1.80 (25, 24)  0.46 (23, 26)  0.88 (24, 27)  0.32 (27, 25) 
Armenia  1.17 (7, 20)  0.10 (5, 7)  0.47 (1, 17)  0.15 (7, 10) 
Azerbaijan  2.89 (24, 26)  0.27 (16, 22)  0.57 (10, 23)  0.21 (13, 20) 
Belarus  1.11 (15, 19)  0.22 (15, 16)  0.04 (2, 1)  0.07 (12, 3) 
Bosnia  0.39 (9, 3)  0.20 (11, 13)  0.84 (22, 26)  0.25 (24, 22) 
Bulgaria  1.58 (17, 23)  0.16 (18, 12)  0.51 (27, 19)  0.19 (19, 16) 
Croatia  0.76 (2, 10)  0.11 (3, 9)  0.26 (14, 10)  0.18 (16, 15) 
Czech. Rep.  0.63 (6, 6)  0.10 (4, 6)  0.38 (7, 12)  0.20 (6, 19) 
Estonia  0.29 (1, 2)  0.06 (2, 2)  0.17 (8, 6)  0.04 (1, 2) 
Georgia  0.46 (23, 4)  0.07 (25, 3)  0.16 (21, 4)  0.20 (26, 17) 
Hungary  1.06 (10, 15)  1.06 (10, 15)  0.19 (5, 8)  0.11 (3, 7) 
Kazakhstan  1.42 (19, 21)  0.10 (12, 5)  0.19 (3, 7)  0.12 (9, 8) 
Kyrgyz Rep.  2.46 (26, 25)  0.53 (27, 27)  0.45 (16, 21)  0.33 (15, 26) 
Latvia  0.71 (8, 9)  0.07 (7, 4)  0.46 (23, 20)  0.10 (5, 5) 
Lithuania  0.87 (3, 12)  0.24 (10, 20)  0.46 (11, 22)  0.14 (10, 9) 
Macedonia  0.62 (4, 5)  0.25 (13, 21)  0.73 (26, 25)  0.35 (23, 27) 
Moldova  1.09 (18, 18)  0.22 (19, 17)  0.45 (13, 15)  0.20 (20, 18) 
Poland  0.70 (11, 8)  0.15 (8, 11)  0.33 (6, 13)  0.16 (18, 12) 
Romania  0.81 (21, 11)  0.23 (24, 18)  0.36 (15, 14)  0.29 (25, 24) 
Russia  1.07 (12, 16)  0.39 (26, 25)  0.29 (4, 11)  0.17 (8, 13) 
Serbia/Mont.  0.67 (16, 7)  0.33 (6, 24)  0.61 (20, 24)  0.26 (11, 23) 
Slovak Rep.   0.93 (13, 13)  0.11 (22, 8)  0.22 (17, 5)  0.11 (21, 6) 
Slovenia  0.17 (5, 1)  0.05 (1, 1)  0.16 (12, 3)  0.04 (2, 1) 
Tajikistan  1.07 (22, 17)  0.21 (21, 14)  0.48 (19, 18)  0.16 (14, 14) 
Turkey  --  0.13 (14, 10)  0.39 (25, 16)  0.17 (17, 14) 
Ukraine  1.52 (20, 22)  0.28 (20, 23)  0.20 (9, 9)  0.23 (22, 21) 
Uzbekistan  0.99 (14, 14)  0.21 (9, 15)  0.10 (18, 2)  0.09 (4, 4) 
*Proportions (as defined in Table 2) are reported for bribe frequency, state capture and 
corruption as an obstacle.   52
Table 4 
Corruption trends in ECA, 2002-2005 BEEPS  
(a –  or + respectively indicates a reduction or increase in corruption) 
  Changes in means or proportions (ranks in parentheses) 








Albania  -1.51 (4)  +0.20 (24)  +0.10 (27)  -0.16 (2) 
Armenia  +0.25 (26)  -0.23 (16)  +0.10 (26)  +0.01 (20) 
Azerbaijan  +0.15 (25)  +0.06 (23)  +0.07 (25)  +0.01 (21) 
Belarus  -0.38 (16)  -0.29 (15)  -0.03 (9)  -0.11 (4) 
Bosnia  -0.56 (11)  +0.01 (21)  +0.05 (24)  -0.10 (5) 
Bulgaria  -0.37 (16)  -0.60 (5)  -0.16 (1)  -0.06 (8) 
Croatia  +0.12 (23)  -0.10(18)  -0.05 (8)  -0.04 (13) 
Czech. Rep.  -0.29 (18)  -0.12 (17)  +0.04 (21)  +0.08 (25) 
Estonia  -0.05 (21)  -0.43 (8)  -0.02 (10)  -0.01 (18) 
Georgia  -2.28 (1)  -1.42 (1)  -0.09 (5)  -0.15 (3) 
Hungary  +0.10 (22)  -0.35 (9)  +0.01 (15)  +0.02 (22) 
Kazakhstan  -0.68 (8)  -0.31 (11)  -0.00 (13)  -0.02 (15) 
Kyrgyz Rep.  -1.24 (5)  +0.35 (26)  +0.03 (20)  +0.12 (27) 
Latvia  -0.22 (19)  -0.52 (7)  -0.09 (3)  +0.02 (16) 
Lithuania  +0.14 (24)  +0.33 (25)  +0.02 (17)  +0.02 (17) 
Macedonia  -0.17 (6)  +0.01 (20)  +0.00 (14)  +0.03 (24) 
Moldova  -0.99 (6)  -0.35 (10)  +0.01 (16)  +0.06 (10) 
Poland  -0.51 (13)  -0.31 (12)  +0.05 (23)  -0.09 (6) 
Romania  -1.75 (2)  -0.72 (4)  -0.02 (11)  -0.06 (9) 
Russia  -0.36 (17)  +0.05 (22)  +0.04 (22)  +0.03 (23) 
Serbia/Mont.  -0.85 (7)  +0.50 (27)  +0.03 (18)  +0.09 (26) 
Slovak Rep.   -0.52 (12)  -0.77 (2)  -0.11 (2)  -0.17 (1) 
Slovenia  -0.62 (10)  -0.30 (14)  -0.06 (7)  -0.02 (14) 
Tajikistan  -1.52 (3)  -0.53 (6)  +0.03 (19)  -0.04 (12) 
Turkey  --  -0.75 (3)  -0.09 (4)  -0.07 (7) 
Ukraine  -0.67 (9)  -0.30 (13)  -0.01 (12)  -0.05 (11) 
Uzbekistan  -0.46 (14)  +0.01 (19)  -0.08 (6)  -0.01 (19)   53
Table 5 
Corruption Trends for ECA in Non-BEEPS Sources 
  
Mean value  Mean rank  Source N   
ECA, all 
Scale 
2002 2005 2002 2005 
CPIA Q16   27, 134  1 – 6  3.11  3.30  64  61 
Nations in Transit*   27, 27  1 – 7  4.85  4.80  --  -- 
ICRG  21, 140  0 – 6  2.07  2.19  82  76 
WEF  
Favoritism in decisions  2.91   2.79  52  53 
Diversion of public funds  3.29  3.33  48  48 
Business costs of corruption  4.51  4.07  45  51 
Financial honesty of politicians  2.11  2.17  50  50 
Irregular payments in…   
…exports & imports  4.44  4.77  49  45 
…public utilities  5.06  5.38  46  42 
…tax collection  4.89  5.29  44  41 
…public contracts  3.78  3.90  49  48 
…judicial decisions 
14, 79  1 – 7 
4.80 4.42  51  49 
TI corruption perceptions  28, 152  0-10  3.25  3.29  92  88 
WBI control of corruption  28, 184  0 +/- sd  -0.41  -0.37  111  106 
*NIT is the only source for which larger values indicate more corruption.  Median value 
for NIT was 5.25 in 2002, improving to 5 in 2005.  Average change in CPIA Q16, and in 
WBI control of corruption, are for 2002-2004. 
 
Table 6 
Changes in CPIA Q16, 2002-2004, by region 
 
 Change  2002-4  2004  2002 
EAP (18)  +0.32  3.12  2.79 
ECA (27)  +0.19  3.30  3.11 
AFR (45)  +0.12  2.95  2.83 
LAC (28)  +0.09  3.54  3.45 
SAR (7)  +0.00  3.21  3.21 
MNA (9)  -0.06  2.89  2.95 
All (134)  +0.14  3.18  3.04 
 
Table 7: correlations in changes from 2002 to 2005 
 
 NIT  ICRG  CPIA 
ICRG -.34  --  -- 
CPIA -.34  -.17  -- 
EIU +.31 -.02 +.02 
Higher values indicate more corruption in the NIT and EIU scales, but less corruption on 
ICRG and CPIA.  Correlations in the “wrong” direction are shown in italics.   54
Table 8 
What Aspects of Corruption do Broad Perceptions Measures Capture? 
Evidence from the 2005 BEEPS and WEF  
 
 NIT  ICRG  CPIA  EIU  Obstacle  TI  WBI 
BEEPS 
Bribe tax (Q40)  .54  -.50  -.44  .52  .37  -.48  -.51 
Bribe frequency (Q39a)  .57  -.52  -.54  .80  .60  -.60  -.58 
Bribe predictability (Q39b)  .56  -.48  -.52  .65  .52  -.61  -.58 
Obstacle to business (Q54q)  .31  -.35  -.12  .50  --  -.46  -.33 
Kickback in govt. contracts 
(Q42) 
.14 -.04 -.04 .19  .33 -.15  -.12 
Administrative corruption   
Utilities (Q41a)  .50  -.34  -.52  .60  .54  -.60  -.55 
Licenses & permits (Q41b)  .68  -.58  -.66  .82  .59  -.70  -.70 
Government contracts (Q41c)  -.08  -.07  .21  .01 .57  -.06  .05 
Health/safety inspections 
(Q41d) 
.05 -.33 .02  .38 .54  -.17  -.09 
Fire/building inspections 
(Q41e) 
.50 -.52 -.43 .58  .18 -.45  -.50 
Environmental inspections 
(Q41f) 
.43 -.42 -.34 .52  .53 -.40  -.41 
Taxes & tax collections 
(Q41g) 
.65 -.58 -.68 .79  .49 -.66  -.69 
Customs/imports (Q41h)  .38  -.41  -.35  .58  .72  -.46  -.42 
Courts (Q41i)  .30  -.40  -.22  .47  .67  -.41  -.33 
State capture            
Influence legislation/rules 
(Q41j) 
.03 -.20 .03  .09 .62  -.11  -.04 
Impact of capture: parliament 
(Q44a) 
.15 -.39 -.08 .36  .68 -.28  -.19 
Impacted of capture: govt. off. 
(Q44b) 
.13 -.29 -.06 .32  .73 -.27  -.17 
WEF 
Favoritism in decisions  -.34  .49  .28  -.43  -.52  .52  .39 
Diversion of public funds  -.52  .56  .42  -.66  -.83  .67  .58 
Business costs of corruption  -.72  .65  .72  -.79  -.68  .80  .79 
Financial honesty of politicians  -.22  .44  .04  -.36  -.63  .40  .24 
Irregular payments in…   
…exports & imports  -.73  .59  .77  -.68  -.57  .85 .79 
…public utilities  -.73  .58  .78  -.73  -.55  .86 .81 
…tax collection  -.74  .69  .77  -.68  -.49  .82 .80 
…public contracts  -.26  .05  .27  -.10  -.40  .53 .35 
…judicial decisions  -.69  .57  .67  -.57  -.55  .82 .75 
Correlations with counterintuitive signs are shown in italics.  Correlations in bold 
indicate correlation by construction; i.e. the variable is a component of the composite 
index in question. 
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Appendix A 
Availability of data for both 2002 and 2005 
 
 BEEPS NIT  CPIA  WEF  ICRG 
Albania Y  Y  Y  2005  Y 
Armenia Y  Y  Y  2005  Y 
Azerbaijan Y  Y  Y  2005  Y 
Belarus  Y Y Y N Y 
Bosnia Y  Y  Y  2005  N 
Bulgaria  Y Y Y Y Y 
Croatia  Y Y Y Y Y 
Czech.  Rep.  Y Y Y Y Y 
Estonia  Y Y Y Y Y 
Georgia Y  Y  Y  2005  N 
Hungary  Y Y Y Y Y 
Kazakhstan Y  Y  Y  2005  Y 
Kyrgyz Rep.  Y  Y  Y  2005  N 
Latvia  Y Y Y Y Y 
Lithuania  Y Y Y Y Y 
Macedonia Y  Y  Y  2005  N 
Moldova Y  Y  Y  2005  Y 
Poland  Y Y Y Y Y 
Romania  Y Y Y Y Y 
Russia  Y Y Y Y Y 
Serbia/Mont. Y Y Y  2005  Y 
Slovak Rep.   Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Slovenia Y  Y  2002  Y  Y 
Tajikistan Y  Y  Y  2005  N 
Turkey  Y N Y Y Y 
Turkmenistan  N Y Y N N 
Ukraine  Y Y Y Y Y 
Uzbekistan  Y Y Y N N 
Y = 2002 and 2005 available, N = neither year available   58
Appendix B: Definitions of Corruption Indicators 
 
1. BEEPS Questions 
 
Bribe frequency & predictability: 
Thinking about officials, would you say the following statements are always, usually, frequently, 
sometimes, seldom or never true?  
(Never=1, seldom=2, sometimes=3, frequently=4, usually=5, always=6) 
•  “It is common for firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular ‘additional 
payments/gifts’ to get things done with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, 
services etc.” (Q39a) 
•  “Firms in my line of business usually know in advance about how much this ‘additional 
payment/gift is.” (Q39b) 
 
Bribe tax (Q40): 
On average, what percent of total annual sales do firms like yours typically pay in unofficial 
payments/gifts to public officials?  ______% 
 
Corruption as a problem doing business (Q54q) 
Can you tell me how problematic are these different factors for the operation and growth of your 
business: … Corruption 
(No obstacle=1  Minor obstacle=2  Moderate obstacle=3  Major obstacle=4) 
 
Kickback for government contracts (Q42) 
When firms in your industry do business with the government, what percent of the contract value 
would be typically paid in additional or unofficial payments/gifts to secure the contract?  
______% 
 
Sector-specific bribe frequency (Q41) 
Thinking now of unofficial payments/gifts that a firm like yours would make in a given year, 
could you please tell me how often would they make payments/gifts for the following purposes: 
(Never=1, seldom=2, sometimes=3, frequently=4, usually=5, always=6) 
  To get connected to and maintain public services (electricity and telephone) (Q41a) 
  To obtain business licenses and permits (Q41b) 
  To obtain government contracts (Q41c) 
  To deal with occupational health and safety inspection (Q41d) 
  To deal with fire and building inspections (Q41e) 
  To deal with environmental inspections (Q41f) 
  To deal with taxes and tax collection (Q41g) 
  To deal with customs/imports (Q41h) 
  To deal with courts (Q41i) 
  To influence the content of new legislation rules decrees etc. (Q41j) 
 
Impact of capture (Q44) 
It is often said that firms make unofficial payments/gifts, private payments or other benefits to 
public officials to gain advantages in the drafting of laws, decrees, regulations, and other binding 
government decisions.  To what extent have the following practices had a direct impact on your 
business? 
(No impact, minor impact, moderate impact, major impact, decisive impact) 
  Private payments/gifts or other benefits to Parliamentarians to affect their vote (Q44a) 
  Private payments/gifts or other benefits to Government officials to affect the content of 
government decrees (Q44b)   59
2. Nations in Transit (http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htm) 
 
For all 28 countries and territories in Nations in Transit 2005, Freedom House, in 
consultation with the report authors and a panel of academic advisers, has provided 
numerical ratings [on corruption and six other variables].  The ratings are based on a 
scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level. 
 
The ratings follow a quarter-point scale.  Minor to moderate developments typically 
warrant a positive or negative change of a quarter (0.25) to a half (0.50) point.  
Significant developments typically warrant a positive or negative change of three-
quarters (0.75) to a full (1.00) point.  It is rare that the rating in any category will 
fluctuate by more than a full point (1.00) in a single year. 
 
The ratings process for Nations in Transit 2005 involved four steps: 
 
1.  Authors of individual country reports suggested preliminary ratings in all seven 
categories covered by the study. 
2.  The U. S. and CEE-NIS (Central and Eastern Europe-Newly Independent States) 
academic advisers evaluated the ratings and made revisions. 
3.  Report authors were given the opportunity to dispute any revised rating that 
differed from the original by more than .50 point. 
4.  Freedom House refereed any disputed ratings and, if the evidence warranted, 
considered further adjustments.  Final editorial authority for the ratings rested 
with Freedom House. 
 
Corruption.  [Ratings reflect] public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of 
top policy makers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy 
of anticorruption initiatives. 
1.  Has the government implemented effective anticorruption initiatives? 
2.  Is the country’s economy free of excessive statement involvement? 
3.  Is the government free from excessive bureaucratic regulations, registration 
requirements, and other controls that increase opportunities for corruption? 
4.  Are there significant limitations on the participation of government officials in 
economic life? 
5.  Are there adequate laws requiring financial disclosure and disallowing conflict of 
interest? 
6.  Does the government advertise jobs and contracts? 
7.  Does the state enforce an effective legislative or administrative process—
particularly one that is free of prejudice against one’s political opponents—to 
prevent, investigate, and prosecute the corruption of government t officials and 
civil servants? 
8.  Do whistle-blowers, anticorruption activists, investigators, and journalists enjoy 
legal protections that make them feel secure about reporting cases of bribery and 
corruption? 
9.  Are allegations of corruption given wide and extensive airing in the media? 
10. Does the public display a high intolerance for official corruption?   60
3. World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
 Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector 
This criterion assesses the extent to which the executive can be held accountable 
for its use of funds and the results of its actions by the electorate and by the legislature 
and judiciary, and the extent to which public employees within the executive are required 
to account for the use of resources, administrative decisions, and results obtained.  Both 
levels of accountability are enhanced by transparency in decision-making, public audit 
institutions, access to relevant and timely information, and public and media scrutiny.  A 
high degree of accountability and transparency discourages corruption, or the abuse of 
public office for private gain.  National and sub-national governments should be 
appropriately weighted.  Each of three dimensions should be rated separately: (a) the 
accountability of the executive to oversight institutions and of public employees for their 
performance; (b) access of civil society to information on public affairs; and (c) state 
capture by narrow vested interests.  For the overall rating, these three dimensions should 
receive equal weighting.  A rating for each dimension should be provided in the write-up 






1  a.  There are no checks and balances on executive power. Public officials use their positions for personal gain 
and take bribes openly. Seats in the legislature and positions in the civil service are often bought and sold. 
  b.  Government decision-making is secretive. The public is prevented from participating in or learning about 
decisions and their implications. 
c.  The state has been captured by narrow interests (economic, political, ethnic, and/or military). 
Administrative corruption is rampant. 
2  a.  There are only ineffective audits and other checks and balances on executive power. Public officials are not 
sanctioned for failures in service delivery or for receiving bribes.     
  b.  Decision making is not transparent, and government withholds information needed by the public and civil 
society organizations to judge its performance. The media are not independent of government or powerful 
business interests.       
  c.  Boundaries between the public and private sector are ill-defined, and conflicts of interest abound. Laws and 
policies are biased towards narrow private interests. Implementation of laws and policies is distorted by 
corruption, and resources budgeted for public services are diverted to private gain.  
 
3 a. External  accountability  mechanisms such as inspector-general, ombudsman, or independent audit may 
exist, but have inadequate resources or authority.       
  b.  Decision making is generally not transparent, and public dissemination of information on government 
policies and outcomes is a low priority. Restrictions on the media limit its potential for information-
gathering and scrutiny.  
  c.  Elected and other public officials often have private interests that conflict with their professional duties. 
  
4 a. External  accountability  mechanisms limit somewhat the degree to which special interests can divert 
resources or influence policy making through illicit and non-transparent means.  Risks and opportunities for 
corruption within the executive are reduced through adequate monitoring and reporting lines.       
  b.  Decision making is generally transparent. Government actively attempts to distribute  relevant information 
to the public, although capacity may be a constraint. Significant parts of the media operate outside the 
influence of government or powerful business interests, and media publicity provides some deterrent 
against unethical behavior.  
  c.  Conflict of interest and ethics rules exist and the prospect of sanctions has some effect on the extent to 
which public officials shape policies to further their own private interests. 
   
5     a.   Accountability for decisions is ensured through a strong public service ethic reinforced by audits, 
inspections, and adverse publicity for performance failures. The judiciary is impartial and independent of 
other branches of government. Authorities monitor the prevalence of corruption and implement sanctions 
transparently. 
  b.  The reasons for decisions, and their results and costs, are clear and communicated to the general public. 
Citizens can obtain government documents at nominal cost. Both state-owned (if any) and private media are 
independent of government influence and fulfill critical oversight roles.  
  c.  Conflict of interest and ethics rules for public servants are observed and enforced.  Top government 
officials are required to disclose income and assets, and are not immune from prosecution under the law for 
malfeasance.  
6       Criteria for “5” on all three sub-ratings are fully met. There are no warning signs of possible deterioration, 
and there is widespread expectation of continued strong or improving performance.   62




This is an assessment of corruption within the political system.  Such corruption is a 
threat to foreign investment for several reasons: it distorts the economic and financial 
environment; it reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to 
assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability, and, last but not least, 
introduces an inherent instability into the political process. 
 
The most common form of corruption met directly by business is financial corruption in 
the form of demands for special payments and bribes connected with import and export 
licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans.  Such corruption 
can make it difficult to conduct business effectively, and in some cases may force the 
withdrawal or withholding of an investment. 
 
Although our measure takes such corruption into account, it is more concerned with 
actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job 
reservations, 'favor-for-favors', secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between 
politics and business.  In our view these insidious sorts of corruption are potentially of 
much greater risk to foreign business in that they can lead to popular discontent, 
unrealistic and inefficient controls on the state economy, and encourage the development 
of the black market. 
 
The greatest risk in such corruption is that at some time it will become so overweening, 
or some major scandal will be suddenly revealed, as to provoke a popular backlash, 
resulting in a fall or overthrow of the government, a major reorganizing or restructuring 
of the country's political institutions, or, at worst, a breakdown in law and order, 
rendering the country ungovernable.   63
5. World Economic Forum (http://www.weforum.org/), Executive Opinion Survey  
 
Corruption-related questions, included in both 2002-3 and 2005-6 surveys 
 
Irregular payments in exports and imports 
In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make undocumented 
extra payments or bribes connected with export and import permits? (1 = common, 7 = 
never occurs) 
 
Irregular payments public utilities 
In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make undocumented 
extra payments or bribes when getting connected to public utilities? (1 = common, 7 = 
never occurs) 
 
Irregular payments in tax collection 
In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make undocumented 
extra payments or bribes connected with annual tax payments? (1 = common, 7 = never 
occurs) 
 
Irregular payments in public contracts 
In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make undocumented 
extra payments or bribes connected with public contracts (investment projects)? (1 = 
common, 7 = never occurs) 
 
Irregular payments in judicial decisions 
In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make undocumented 
extra payments or bribes connected with getting favorable judicial decisions? (1 = 
common, 7 = never occurs) 
 
Business costs of corruption 
Do other firms’ illegal payments to influence government policies, laws or regulations 
impose costs or otherwise negatively affect your firm? (1 = impose large costs, 7 = 
impose no costs/not relevant) 
 
Favoritism in decisions of government officials 
When deciding upon policies and contracts, government officials (1 = usually favor well-
connected firms and individuals, 7 = are neutral among firms and individuals) 
 
Diversion of public funds 
In your country, diversion of public funds to companies, individuals or groups due to 
corruption (1 = is common, 7 = never occurs) 
 
Public trust of politicians 
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